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Abstract 
Kurds are one of the ethnic nationalities in the Middle East. Middle East is a principal location of majority of the 
Kurds’ ethnic nationality and they form important minority group in both Syria and Turkey. The region has been 
their natural abode from the earliest time; and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after the First World 
War had a lasting impact on the political emancipation of the Kurds in the Middle East, notably in Turkey and 
Syria. With the collateral collapse of the empire under which the Kurds had been ruled for centuries, they were 
unnaturally conditioned to belong to different national entity in the Middle East. Such unwilling disintegration of 
Kurds into many states in the Middle East has been a crucial political and social issue in the region. The 
seemingly unending agitation for political emancipation has been a perennial political issue bothering both 
regional and global powers who have their interest to protect in the region. One of such major powers is the U.S. 
who has been making its presence felt in the region since the period of First World War. This article is an 
extension of boundary of knowledge on how the Kurds political agitation in the region has been inextricably 
interwoven with the national interest of the U.S. in both Turkey and Syria. In doing this, the researchers rely on 
the existing government records, online media reports and existing scholarly writings. In making use of these 
sources, latent content analysis is employed to mine the data. 
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Introduction 
The term Middle East today is used to refer to Egypt, the Levant, Arabia, and the Gulf region. The defeat of 
Ottoman Empire (Turkey) in the First World War and eventual takeover of its former satellites of Arab states led 
to the general use of the word to all former Turkish possessions (Mansfield, 2013). Therefore, all states 
encompassing the Middle East region are one of the significant areas in the formulation of the U.S. foreign 
policy. The U.S. interest in the area is guided by its national security, which is closely tied to economic 
prosperity and that dictates the direction of its foreign policy towards the region. The expression of Kurdish 
nationalism started during the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a process of 
centralization. Before the centralization process, the Kurdish Emirates had enjoyed some modicum of autonomy. 
The Kurds had been under the control of  Ottoman authority as early as the 16th century, and due to some 
political designs the Kurds were organized into Emirates, (principalities) enjoying a  degree of autonomy, 
although still under the Istanbul control (Yegen, 1996). The Kurds, as a people had been living on the frontiers 
of empires, borderlands, and across borders as they evolved, fashioned out complex strategies for solving issues 
of sovereignty and access to resources (Webinger, 2015). 
It needs to be reiterated that towards the tail end of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds as a people began to 
enjoy some degree of developments in social life alongside the emergence of Kurdish national awareness as an 
intellectual movement. The French Revolution, with its ideological contents of freedom, enlightenment, 
nationalism and the right of man radiated to all parts of Europe. It was during this period that Kurds came in 
contact with the idea of nationalism which strengthened loyalty and bond among all the Kurds. In a way, 
therefore, the French revolution spurred the growth and development of nationalism in the social and political 
dictionary of the Kurds (Aydın, 2005). The nationalist sentiment thus grew among the Kurds like other 
nationalities within the Ottoman Empire. This nationalist urge led to the formation of secret societies so as to 
disentangle from the clutches of Ottoman imperial domination (Farouk-Sluglett, 1991). The response of the 
Ottoman leaders to Kurds aspirations was met with stiff resistance which led to periodical uprisings between 
1808 and 1839. Nearly all the resistance failed because of the inability to carry along the majority of Kurds as 
well as those in the administrative cadres. It also needs to be noted that the disunity among the Kurds which is a 
reminiscence of power struggles among various tribes led to the failure of the struggle against the centre, the 
Ottoman Empire (Haddad, 2001). Most Kurdish leader of the Ottoman period did not really understand what 
constituted the national entity of Kurds and most of the leaders also pursued personal interests instead of 
collective interest (Webinger, 2015).  
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However, the Young Turks' revolt in 1908 had first promised to retain equal rights for all the ethnic 
nationalities residing within the Empire, but terminated by stopping all non-Turkish forms of cultural and 
political emancipation (Haddad, 2001). The nascent period of Kurdish nationalist sentiment met with conflict 
from Turkish authority and such led to conflict situation as opposed to peaceful co-existence between the two. 
From the year of Republic formation the Turkish authority has been resenting an attempt by Kurds to have 
regional government cum autonomy. Any attempt at having such is met with condemnation from central 
authority. Thus, governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have been practicing exclusionary policy to the 
detriment of the Kurds nationals within their statehood (Mango, 1999).  
To be specific therefore, the study aims to examine the U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds in the Middle 
East and tries to highlight the stresses and strains thereof. In addition, the research focuses on the U.S. policy 
towards the Kurds in Turkey and Syria and seeks to understand the reaction of these national governments to the 
conduct of such para-diplomacy. Such para-diplomatic activities between sub-national entities and U.S. have 
received criticisms from the region, most especially Turkey and Iraq. Thus, in order to better understand this, the 
article attempts to answer the following questions: What is the guidepost of the U.S. policy towards the Kurds in 
the Middle East? What are the U.S. interests with the countries that have significant Kurds’ population?  And 
lastly, is the region still important to the U.S. given the discovery of the shale oil? To provide empirical detail to 
these questions therefore this article examines the U.S. policy towards Syria and Turkey in relations to Kurds 
agitation and interest. It needs to be stressed here that it is not in the interest of this article to go into empirical 
detail of U.S. policy towards all these countries rather the intent of the research is to appraise in its totality the 
response of the superpower to Kurds’ agitations in the countries mentioned. To that effect therefore, the article is 
segmented into sections with each looking broadly at specific issue.  
 
U.S. Foreign Policy towards the Turkish Kurds 
The U.S. and Turkey have continuously stood shoulder-to-shoulder in facing serious foreign and defense policy 
challenges. This close rapport started during the Korean War, in which 15,000 Turkish troops fought alongside 
the U.S. soldiers and to Washington’s leadership in securing Turkish joining the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1951 (Larrabee, 2008). During the ensuing decades, Turkey maintained the second 
largest military in NATO and played an important role in the defense of Europe as well as in planning for what 
later came to be known as “out-of-area” contingencies (Cook, 2006). The political and diplomatic relationships 
between the Republic of Turkey and the U.S. have always been progressive and reflective of the historical 
moment in time. During the Cold War, the common strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union aided the 
cooperation between the two countries. Yet, relations were still dictated by regional issues and domestic politics 
in both capitals. The traditional foundation of the U.S.-Turkey alliance has always been between the two 
countries’ militaries, which are highly connected and integrated in the context of a harmonized NATO 
framework and as a result of continuous bilateral cooperation (Walker, 2010). 
The end of the Cold War had an important turning point on Turkish foreign policy. During the Cold War, 
Turkey devoted its attention primarily on containing Soviet power and strengthening its ties with its allies in the 
West. The end of the Cold War, however, removed the Soviet threat, which resulted in fears among Turks that 
Turkey would lose its strategic importance to the U.S. These fears have proven otherwise as Turkey’s strategic 
importance has been intensified and acknowledged. This is because the U.S. needs Turkish strategic cooperation 
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Larrabee, 2008). The pivotal goals of the U.S. in the foreign policy are to 
improve stability, speeding up democratization process, introduction of a free market economy, improvement in 
trading and commercial relations, controlling nuclear weapons and to encourage human rights standards. Thus, 
the main goal can be defined as blocking the spread of influence of existing radical regimes and preventing the 
creation of new ones (Aras, 1997). It has been said that the only places where all these goals and objectives can 
be attained are Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus. Therefore, Turkey remains a prime actor in many crucial 
issues of the U.S. in the foreign, national security, and economic policy. For six decades, a sound relationship 
with Turkey has been central to advancing U.S. interests in Eurasia and the Middle East and to creating new 
strategic opportunities for the U.S. and its other NATO allies (Flanagan & Brannen, 2008). 
In the case of the U.S. foreign policy toward the Kurds in Turkey, Kurds in Turkey are not strategically 
important to the U.S. unlike the Iraqi Kurds. In this manner the U.S. classified Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) a 
terrorist organization and as such assisting Turkey in mitigating the activities of this party on Turkish 
government. Kurds form an important minority group in Turkey as they constitute about 13 percent of the 
Turkey population (CIA Factbook, 2018). The Kurds form an important element in the national and social 
political landscape of Turkey. Despite being an important partner in the Turkish national entity, they are still not 
fully recognized as equal partner and such in most cases pitied the various Kurds’ emancipation groups against 
the national government. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a major role in 1999 to capture the head 
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Abdullah Ocalan, in Nairobi. However, disagreement does exist between 
Turkey and the U.S. on the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which largely represents the Syrian Kurds. With the 
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emergence of Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the U.S. used PYD to fight ISIS but Turkey believes the 
PYD is an extension of the PKK and in such conclusion Turkish government did not want the U.S. to support 
this faction as it has been declared a terrorist group. In this way, Erdogan was of the view that the U.S. has to 
choose between Turkey and PYD. The U.S. in this case opined that the organization should not be seen as a 
terrorist organization rather a group that is peaceful and civil. It is on record that Turkey descended heavily on 
PKK in 1980 with the U.S. weapons when the uprising arose. The Turkish government even crossed the border 
to Northern Iraq to deal militarily with the PKK forces. In all these the U.S. did not react in any way against such 
attack. It needs to be stressed here that it was in 1997 that the U.S. government designated PKK as a foreign 
terrorist group. In this while the Clinton government assisted the Turkey in capturing the PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1999. Such capturing was made possible with the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic support to the 
Turkish government. The Iraqi Kurds began to enjoin the U.S. assistance only after there was intense diplomatic 
row between the Turkish government and the U.S. over the invasion of Iraq. In 2003, the U.S. government 
decided to seek for Turkish cooperation in the process of invading Iraq. Such was rejected by Ankara and such 
rejection led to the diversion of diplomatic relation with Iraqi Kurds. Turkey was concerned that the new 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG, now headed by Mustafa Barzani’s son Masoud) could threaten Iraqi 
unity, and serve both as a rallying point for Kurdish irredentism inside Turkey and a safe haven for PKK 
militants. In an attempt at invading Kurds in Iraq by Turkey, the U.S. government prevented such attack and as 
well arrested eleven Turkish soldiers who were planning attack and sabotage against the Kurds in Iraq. Despite 
these tensions, the U.S. government assisted Turkey to deal with PKK base in Northern Iraq. This step received 
approval from KRG and the U.S. stepped in to assist Turkey in striking the PKK base in Northern Iraq. In 2011, 
announcement was made by the U.S. government to assist Turkey with advanced military equipment to employ 
against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq. Such assistance led to the U.S. supplying Turkey with cobra helicopters 
and predator drones. However, Turkish officials continued to voice frustration with the level of U.S. assistance 
they were receiving against PKK militants sheltering in northern Iraq, especially as clashes between Turkish 
security forces and PKK fighters inside Turkey intensified throughout 2012. Ankara in particular sought U.S. 
assistance to arrest PKK members entering KRG-controlled northern Iraq from abroad, but the U.S. reneged, 
fearing that this would increase tension both with the PKK and the KRG leadership in Irbil. 
 It needs to be said that Washington has constantly held conviction that Ankara should do more to address 
the grievances of its own Kurdish population. The U.S. government thus supported moves by Turkey’s ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to loosen restrictions on expressions of Kurdish identity 
within Turkey and to evolve a peace process with the PKK. U.S. officials have reiterated their support of the 
“Kurdish opening” that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly made known in the summer of 
2009.  Nevertheless, the U.S. government still considers the PKK a potent foreign terrorist association.  
The narratives above suggest that there is no significant relationship between the U.S. government and 
Kurdish in Turkey. The main factor that normally brings the Kurds in Turkey to the limelight is when there is 
political tension between the U.S. and Turkey.  
 
The U.S. Foreign policy toward the Syria Kurds 
The north, most importantly, the north east of Syria is the Kurdish strongholds and the place is known as Kurdish 
Syria or Rojava (Gentz., 2013). Kurds are the largest non Arab ethnic minority in Syria. According to Human ‐
Rights Watch, there are unstable statistics on the total number of Kurds in Syria, reliable sources place the 
number of Kurds between 8.5 percent and 10 percent of the population of 13.8 million (CIA Factbook, 2018). 
Most Kurds are followers of the Sunni Muslim faith, although a large minority belong to Shi’a Muslim sects, and 
smaller numbers are non-Muslim, Yazidis (Neriah, 2012). The largest number of Kurds in Syria is located in 
Hasakeh governorate in the northeastern part of the country. Aleppo governorate in the northwest is also home to 
a large number of Kurds, mainly in and around Ayn al-’Arab, and in Afrin and its surrounding villages (Rusane, 
2016). The Kurds of Syria, in contrast to the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey, are little known in the West, but they 
have similarly strained relations with the state that governs them and face human rights abuses as minority 
(Ziadeh, 2009). But the Syrian Kurds appeared to register their presence after the Arab Spring in 2011 and 
became more known after the occupation of Syria in 2014 by ISIS. It needs to be noted that the emergence of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which allied with the PKK in combating ISIS on ground as the U.S. supporter, 
created more awareness about Kurds existence in Syria.  
The U.S. does not have a long history of any substantial relations with Kurds in Syria until recent political 
debacle in the Middle East. Unlike Kurds in Iraq, Syrian Kurds have not been maintaining any long-lasting 
relationship with the U.S. government at official level. The relationship between Syrian Kurds and the U.S. 
started after the Arab Spring when the Syrian civil war broke out against Bashar Assad's regime and the relation 
became stronger after the emergence of ISIS (Vidal and Bitar, 2017). Washington has taken PYD as an ally to 
fight ISIS on the ground through the military wing of the party, the People's Protection Units (YPG) which 
controls the largest area in Kurdistan part of Syria. The PYD is the most powerful group in Syrian Kurdistan 
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region.  The PYD took control of Rojava in coordination with the forces of Bashar al-Assad,  the forces 
withdrew from the Kurdish areas and handed them over to the Kurds without a fight. This development made 
both Turkey and the Syrian opposition to get angry as PYD is accused of being loyal to the regime of Bashar al-
Assad. 
It is therefore right to assert that the Syrian civil war provided ample chance for Syrian Kurds to register 
their political influence and weight in Syria. In the late 2012, when the Assad regime’s forces withdrew from the 
north of Syria, the PYD occupied three main provinces, namely Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin, and began to develop 
a local autonomous rule in these areas. Turkish policy makers perceived the PYD’s advance in northern Syria as 
a threat to Turkey’s national security mainly because, along with the KRG, which emerged gradually in northern 
Iraq beginning in the early 1990s, this would be the second Kurdish autonomous establishment in Turkey’s 
immediate neighbourhood (Pusane, 2016).  
The Kurdish question in Syria has long been a point of debate between the U.S. and Turkey. Throughout the 
administration of the former U.S. president, Barack Obama, the main issue shaping the U.S. strategy against ISIS 
was a reliance on Kurdish forces. This furtive reliance existed despite Turkish refusal to allow the Kurdish- 
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to spearhead the battle to liberate Raqqa (Nidal & Bitar, 2017). This 
relation got worse when the U.S. decided to arm YPG as Turkish regarded the move as a direct threat to its 
national security. 
Turkish President accused the U.S. of creating a "pool of blood" in the region by failing to recognise 
Kurdish organisations as terror groups. The Turkish president was of the view that the inability of the U.S. to 
register Kurdish organisation as a terror group in Syria helped aggravated the political and military debacle in the 
Middle East. This lamentation came to the fore when the Turkish was trying to provide reason why the political 
stalemate in Syria would not cease as hoped. In an impassioned and sometimes angry address, Mr Erdogan asked 
whether the U.S. was an ally or was working with groups Ankara lists as terror organisations. (BBC, 2016). 
Erdogan retorted: “Hey America! How many times have we had to tell you? Are you together with us or are you 
with the PYD and YPG terror groups?" (News, 2016). The president’s fierce reaction generated controversy in 
the U.S. and among the NATO allies in Europe. In such an intense diplomatic row, Turkey summoned the U.S. 
envoy to Ankara in protest after the U.S. State Department spokesman said that Washington did not recognise 
the PYD as a terror group and would continue to support its operations in Syria (Morning, 2016). Turkish 
concerns are focused on the apparent ascendancy in the region of the PYD, a Syrian Kurdish movement regarded 
as an offshoot of Turkey’s banned Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Turkey has fought an intermittent war on its 
own territory against the P.K.K. separatists since the 1980s. The Turkish government considers Kurdish 
separatists to be the greatest national security threat (Morris, 2012). 
In fact, the U.S. relationship with the PYD and its military wing, YPG, is one of the biggest challenges 
facing the relationship between the U.S. and its strategic ally in the region, Turkey. Turkish discomfort with the 
U.S. support of the YPG is not based on opposition against Syrian Kurds. Despite their efforts to promote 
themselves as the representatives of Syrian Kurds, the YPG poses a direct national security threat to Turkey. The 
group is the Syrian arm of PKK, designated by Turkey, the U.S., and the European Union as a terrorist 
organisation, which has been fighting the Turkish government since 1984. The two groups' close ties have 
previously been established by the U.S. officials including the former U.S. Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, in a 
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing (Ustun, 2017). The Syrian political debacle greatly altered the U.S. 
policy on Syrian Kurds aspirations. Washington was at first not eager to engage the Kurds in Syria, mainly as a 
result of concerns about the main Kurdish force, the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD). The U.S. 
experience toward the KRG in Iraq served as a lesson for engaging PYD in Syria as KRG increasingly becoming 
a threat to the Iraq unity. In this while the U.S. government sounded a note of warning to PYD against declaring 
any form of autonomy in northern Syria. In July 2013, the PYD engaged in a bloody crackdown on Kurdish anti-
Assad protesters in the city of Amuda in which the U.S. clearly condemned. Such criticism did not deter the U.S. 
government from recognizing the PYD as an important force against the Islamist groups, including those that 
have received Turkish support (Mnamneh, 2017). In order to improve the chances of successful combat against 
the Assad regime, The U.S. tried, with little success, to promote the multiparty Kurdish National Council (KNC) 
to serve as a reliable partner as opposed to the PYD in Syria. In doing this the U.S. persuaded the KNC to 
support the united opposition against Assad. It needs to be stated that the military success over al-Qaeda-linked 
Al-Nusra Front by PYD convinced the U.S. of the strategic importance of PYD in Syria. Shortly after the battle, 
Davutoğlu made a point stating that Turkey is not against the rights of any ethnic group in Syria, including the 
Kurds (Stansfield, 2017). In November 2013, the PYD declared it would move ahead with plans to proclaim 
Syrian Kurdistan independent, a move condemned by both Ankara and Barzani’s KRG. In an attempt to reduce 
the disagreements within the Syrian Kurdish groups in the run-up to the January 2014 Geneva II Conference, 
talks were initiated in Irbil between representatives of the PYD and KNC, who agreed to attend the Geneva II 
Conference under a united banner. Both Ankara and Washington have sought to keep the Kurdish issue off the 
agenda at Geneva, however, and the Syrian Kurds were not invited to Geneva as a separate group (Stansfield, 
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2014). The KNC was represented only as part of Syrian opposition delegation, while the PYD was not directly 
represented. Washington’s reluctance to engage in the Kurdish issue in Syria was largely due to the Obama 
administration’s focus on ending the Syrian conflict. The more the conflict drags on the more the PYD looks like 
an effective bulwark against the spread of radicalization, the more open to engagement the U.S. is likely to be, 
Turkish opposition notwithstanding. Prospects for greater US-Turkish coordination on the Kurdish issue in Syria 
are at stake as the Syrian conflict is increasingly becoming a source of tension between Ankara and Washington. 
Both agree on the need to maintain Syria’s territorial integrity. The U.S. has tempered its enthusiasm for rapid 
political change in Syria, and all but abandoned the idea of direct intervention against Assad. With few allies on 
the ground in Syria, Washington increasingly sees its interests aligning with those of the secular PYD. And as 
long as threats to the U.S. interest in Syria cannot be immediately surmounted, PYD and other Kurds groups will 
remain formidable partners in achieving U.S. interest.  
 
Appraisal of Kurds Overall Issue in the Middle East 
Kurds in the Middle East are been repressed by their various national governments since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. The collapse of such mighty empire opened Kurds to the intricacies of the global politics they 
do not have power to control. The aftermath of the Second World War clearly open the vulnerability of the 
Kurds to the intricacies of international politics as the world looked intransigence to the yearnings and 
aspirations of the ethnic group. The eventual creation of the state of Israel in 1948 by Balfour Declaration clearly 
signifies that the global powers could make and unmake the world based on what they think. With the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the attendant granting of independence and recognition by most 
western states and their allies across the globe, it implies that such political gesture could  be extended to address 
the Kurds plight in the Middle East. Kurds are significant minority group in four countries in the Middle East 
and their total population is about 35 million (CIA Factbook, 2018). With such significant demography, the West 
should have considered extending the warm hand of statehood to Kurds in order to protect them from the 
political machinations of the Arabs, Turks and Persians. The reason behind such neglect could be seen from 
different angles. The creation of Israel itself might be a factor. How do we mean? With the creation of Israel as a 
state from the Palestinian entity and with the eventual subjugation of Palestine, Arabs were not contented with 
the whole process. Such discontentment led to Arabs’ hostile relations with the West and the state of Israel. The 
west, most especially the U.S., might have foreseen such resentment from the Arabs and creating another state 
from such geographical confine would complicate the whole political and social atmosphere in the region. In this 
manner, facing the boomerang effect of the creation of Israel was the utmost political priority of the West and it 
could be politically unwise at the time to propose the creation of another state for the Kurds in the same region.  
One needs to recognize that the Jews after the Second World War began to direct their investment towards the 
U.S. and such huge investment awarded them recognition in the scheme of things in the U.S. politics. Such 
recognition of Jews within the U.S. might well explain the insistence of the West in the eventual partition of the 
Palestine to create Israel state. Another explanation advance by most scholars was the holocaust committed 
against the Jews in the Second World War by Nazi Germany (Mansfield, 2013; Stansfield, 2014; Natali, 2010).  
The aftermath of the Second World War led to group of people from the West sympathizing with the helpless 
nature in which the Jews were subjected. Such emotional attachment from the west might as well explain the 
forceful creation of Israel in the Middle East. The Kurds might as well qualify for this political gesture but the 
stake was too high.  The aftermath of the Second World War was the time most of the countries in the Middle 
East began to stabilize themselves as state and most were just trying to gain independence. For example, Syria 
got it s independence in 1946 and Iraq subsequently attained statehood. The states of Turkey and Iran were also 
trying to consolidate their hold on internal socio-political terrain. In such kind of political atmosphere it could be 
anathema to propose the creation of Kurds state. Such proposition could be seen by the Arabs, Turkish and 
Persians as further attempt on the part of the West to partition and destabilize the region again. The U.S. and 
other western allies were just trying to establish cordial relations with the region as well as gaining the region’s 
trust after the demise of colonialism. Thus, the proposal to establish the state of Kurds would be seen as a 
deliberate attempt on the part of the West to dismember some of the states where Kurds reside in the region. In 
essence, Kurds’ plight for statehood in Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkey are affected by twin-factor of global politics 
and issues within each state where Kurds reside. It needs to be state here that only Iraqi Kurds are forcefully 
moving in the direction of gaining self-governing status in the Middle East. The Kurds in other states are 
politically impotent to act the same way as Iraq Kurds. It needs to be reiterated here that Kurds, most especially 
the Iraqi Kurds were unlucky to have resided in a region where oil deposit is located. The main reason behind the 
merger of Kurdistan region of Iraq with Iraq nationhood was the discovery of large deposit of oil in Kirkuk 
which made the British to extend Iraq statehood to the region as a whole (Mansfield, 2013). It should also be 
noted that the Turkish and Iran strategic location in the region as well as an ally of the U.S. played a significant 
role in the direction of U.S. policy towards the Kurds. The West in general would not like to forfeit maintaining 
cordial relationship with some of these states. It is on record that Iran was a good ally of the U.S. during the 
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heyday of Cold War against the Soviet Union. In this sense, how would one expect the issue of Kurds to become 
paramount to the U.S.? The same strategy repeats itself in Turkey to date in relations to Kurdistan issue. The 
issue of Kurds’ statehood anywhere in the Middle East goes beyond the political calculation of the ethnic Kurds. 
What will dictate the direction of their political independence is the geo-politics of the region as a whole and this 
is true especially of Iraqi Kurds. The idea of securing statehood by Syrian, Iranian and Turkish Kurds is very 
remote unless the present political calculations in the region change. It needs to be stated here that the 
Washington’s eagerness to align with Ankara in attempt to contain the boomerang effect of Arab Spring may 
lead to a political quagmire wherein the U.S. would be incapacitated to manage the Kurdish demands and 
emancipation process. This is because of the need to maintain the territorial integrity of both Syria and Iraq.  
 
Conclusion 
Kurds in Syria and Turkey from the foregoing have been affected by the direction of global politics and foreign 
policies of major powers. The U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurds in both countries essentially attuned 
towards achieving its personal goals and objectives in the region. As long as projecting the interest of Kurds in 
the region would sour the relationship with Turkey and other principal allies in the region, the U.S. cannot afford 
such costly venture. In addition, the U.S. is ready to compromise its stance in order to satisfy and maintain its 
interests in the region. When it was time to employ Peshmaga and the PYD to contain the threat of ISIS, it did. 
In other words, there is greater flexibility in the way and manner the U.S. conducts its foreign policy towards the 
Kurds in the Middle East. But as long as national interest supersedes allies’ interest, the U.S. would continue to 
need the assistance of Kurds in maintaining and pursuing some of its interests in the Middle East. 
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